

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 132394

67

ORIGIN EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ISO-00 SS-20 NSC-07 SSO-00 NSCE-00

INRE-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 ACDA-19

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 TRSE-00 SAJ-01

NEA-14 MC-02 OMB-01 DODE-00 OIC-04 /137 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/EE:MVANHEUVEN:EUR/RPM:RHFROWICK:GP

APPROVED BY EUR:JGLOWENSTEIN

EUR/RPM:EJSTREATOR

S/S: SEFRY

----- 096960

O 201952Z JUN 74

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE

USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 132394

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO

SUBJECT: NATOMIN OTTAWA: MORNING SESSION, JUNE 19

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE; VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

1. SHARP (CANADA) SAID HE WAS GRATIFIED THAT MINISTERIAL MEETING WAS TAKING PLACE IN OTTAWA AND THAT NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE PAST YEAR HAD CULMINATED IN A DECLARATION WHICH HE HOPED WOULD BEAR THE NAME OF THAT CITY. COMMENTING THAT THE DECLARATION DID NOT MEET ALL EXPECTATIONS IN FULL, HE NOTED THAT IT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED BY MUTUAL COMPROMISES AND A WILLINGNESS TO SEEK THE BEST. THERE WERE SEVERAL ELEMENTS OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE TO CANADA. SECURITY WAS DESERVEDLY HIGHLIGHTED. THE ALLIANCE NEEDED TO BE STRONG TO NEGOTIATE MBFR. IN THIS CONNECTION, SHARP PLEDGED A CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO MAINTAIN CANADIAN FORCES IN EUROPE. ALSO OF SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 132394

PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE, IN HIS VIEW, WAS THE SECTION ON CONSULTATIONS. FINALLY, PARAGRAPH 12 OF THE DECLARATION, DEALING WITH PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS, DESERVED SPECIAL ATTENTION. THE CONTINUED ACCEPTANCE OF THESE PRINCIPLES

ON THE PART OF THE ALLIES WOULD LEAD TO BETTER RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG NATIONS. SHARP EXTENDED A SPECIAL WORD OF WELCOME TO THE NEW PORTUGUESE FOREIGN MINISTER AND STATED CANADA'S ENCOURAGEMENT AND SUPPORT FOR THE NEW PORTUGUESE REGIME.

2. SYG LUNS TURNED TO AGENDA ITEM ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS, BEGINNING WITH DISCUSSION OF CSCE. SAUVAGNARGUES (FRANCE), EXPRESSING HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE DESIRE OF SOME OF HIS COLLEAGUES FOR PROGRESS AT GENEVA, NOTED THAT SOVIETS HAVE BEEN LESS THAN FORTHCOMING. SAYING HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD NOT TAKE A PROVOCATIVE OR AGGRESSIVE STANCE TOWARD THE SOVIETS, HE THOUGHT NEVERTHELESS THAT THE ALLIED APPROACH SHOULD BE IN LINE WITH THAT OF THE EC-NINE. HE SUGGESTED FOR POSSIBLE INCLUSION IN THE COMMUNIQUE THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE, WHICH HE SAID WAS ILLUSTRATIVE OF FRENCH THINKING: "SOME PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON CERTAIN ISSUES BUT THE RESULTS HAVE NEVERTHELESS BEEN DISAPPOINTING SO FAR."

3. MORO (ITALY), NOTING THAT ALLIANCE WAS COMMITTED TO DETENTE, CHARACTERIZED THE WORK AT GENEVA AS OF REMARKABLE IMPORTANCE. HE WONDERED, HOWEVER, WHETHER THE ALLIANCE HAD NOT SET ITS AMBITIONS TOO HIGH AND SUGGESTED THEY SHOULD BE ADAPTED TO THE FACTS. WHILE HE REMAINED CONVINCED THAT THE AIMS EXPRESSED AT HELSINKI SHOULD BE FULFILLED, WORK AT GENEVA HAD UNISTAKABLY SLOWED. HE SAID, HOWEVER, HE INTERPRETED POSITIVELY RECENT INDICATIONS THAT SOVIET RESERVATIONS WERE BEING SURMOUNTED AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THIS WOULD LEAD TO A "BALANCE OF CONCESSIONS."

4. VAN DER STOEL (NETHERLANDS) THOUGHT IT WOULD BE HARD TO MAINTAIN THAT CSCE PROGRESS WAS SATISFACTORY. FOR WHATEVER REASON, THE SOVIETS WERE BEING UNCOOPERATIVE. THEY WERE ENTICING THE WEST TO SEND HIGH-LEVEL REPRESENTATIVES TO GENEVA, TAKING THE LINE THAT A REVIEW OF
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 132394

ISSUES UNDER DISCUSSION MIGHT LEAD TO QUICK SOLUTIONS. VAN DER STOEL THOUGHT THE ALLIES SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO RESPOND TO SUCH BLANDISHMENTS AND AVOID WASTING IN A FEW WEEKS WHAT HAD TAKEN YEARS TO BUILD. CSCE WOULD DETERMINE THE CHARACTER OF EUROPEAN RELATIONS FOR YEARS TO COME AND THIS MADE IT WORTHWHILE TO PERSEVERE IN GENEVA.

5. IF A CRISIS OCCURRED AT CSCE, VAN DER STOEL THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT THE WESTERN ALLIES SHOULD BE ABLE TO SHOW THAT THE FAULT LAY ELSEWHERE. THEY SHOULD THEREFORE MAINTAIN FLEXIBILITY AND A SPIRIT OF REASONABLENESS.

6. AS FOR BASKET III, VAN DER STOEL SAID THERE SEEMED TO BE SUGGESTIONS FROM EAST EUROPEANS THAT THE SOVIETS HAD SOME MARGIN FOR NEGOTIATION WITHOUT ENDANGERING THEMSELVES. THE WESTERN TASK WAS TO MAKE THE SOVIETS USE THIS MARGIN. IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO GIVE UP ON THE ISSUE OF EAST-WEST CONTACTS BECAUSE IF NEGOTIATIONS FAILED, THIS ISSUE WOULD BE TABOO FOR A LONG TIME TO COME.

7. VAN DER STOEL SAID THE ALLIES SHOULD TAKE THE LINE THAT THE RESULTS IN STAGE II SHOULD DETERMINE HOW TO PROGRESS TO STAGE III. HE BELIEVED THAT THE RESULTS SO FAR HARDLY WARRANTED HOLDING PHASE III AT TOP LEVEL.

8. FISHBACH (LUXEMBOURG) CHARACTERIZED STAGE II AS UNEVEN AND DISAPPOINTING. THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT BE HASTY AND SHOULD AVOID BEING PINNED WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FAILURE. THEY SHOULD REMAIN READY TO NEGOTIATE, BUT LEAVE NO DOUBT THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO PROGRESS INTO STAGE III ONLY IF STAGE II IS SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED.

9. GENSCHER (FRG) SAID IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO DISCUSS CSCE WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE DECLARATION WHICH HAD JUST BEEN APPROVED. THE DECLARATION OUTLINED ALLIED PURPOSES. IT SHOULD ENLIGHTEN THE PUBLIC AND SET STRAIGHT ANY POSSIBLE FALSE IMPRESSIONS WHICH THE SOVIETS WERE TRYING TO CREATE BY SAYING THAT ALL PROBLEMS HAD BEEN SOLVED. SUPPORTING THE FRENCH PROPOSED COMMUNIQUE FORMULATION
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 132394

ON CSCE, GENSCHER SAID THE ALLIES SHOULD SUPPORT THE LINE TAKEN BY THE EC-NINE IN BONN. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL CHANGE OF FRONTIERS, AND SAID ALL PARTIES WOULD BENEFIT FROM PROGRESS ON CBM'S. REAL PROGRESS ALSO IS NEEDED ON BASKET III. THE COMMUNIQUE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE SITUATION WAS NOT SATISFACTORY AND THAT FURTHER PROGRESS WAS REQUIRED. HOWEVER, HE SAID THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT BE SEEN TO DELAY. QUALITY SHOULD TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER CONSIDERATIONS OF TIME. GENSCHER THOUGHT THE LEVEL FOR STAGE III SHOULD BE SIMILAR TO THAT FOR STAGE II.

10. VAN ELSLANDE (BELGIUM) NOTED THAT CSCE WAS STAGNATING ON IMPORTANT ISSUES, AND THAT THE WEST SHOULD IDENTIFY ITS ESSENTIAL OBJECTIVES. HE SUPPORTED THE DANISH PROPOSAL ON FOLLOW-ON. FINALLY, THE WEST SHOULD AVOID FALLING FOR THE PRESSURE TACTICS OF THE SOVIETS.

11. VAN ELSLANDE FAVORED HOLDING STAGE III AT FOREIGN MINISTERS LEVEL. ONLY STARTLING RESULTS WOULD JUSTIFY HOLDING STAGE III AT THE SUMMIT. HE ALSO EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH THE FRENCH SUGGESTION FOR THE COMMUNIQUE

LANGUAGE ON CSCE.

12. TETENES (GREECE) DREW ATTENTION TO THE IMPORTANCE TO HIS COUNTRY -- BECAUSE OF ITS LOCATION ON NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK -- OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE. ON BASKET III, HE FELT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD INSIST ON BASIC OBJECTIVES. TETENES ALSO THOUGHT IT PREMATURE TO

CONSIDER FOLLOW-ON MACHINERY BEFORE THE EMERGENCE OF CONCRETE RESULTS FROM STAGE II. HE SAID HE WAS FLEXIBLE AS TO THE LEVEL FOR STAGE III.

13. THE SECRETARY NOTED SOME BELIEVED THE US WISHED TO ACCELERATE CSCE, PERHAPS AS A RESULT OF BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS, EVEN AT THE EXPENSE OF THE ALLIES. THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. HE RECALLED THAT THE US HAD NEVER ENTERTAINED HIGH EXPECTATIONS FOR CSCE AND EXPECTED IT WOULD LEAD TO THE SITUATION NOW EXISTING. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT EUROPEAN LEADERS HAVE URGED US
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 132394

TO GO ALONG. THE US HAD DONE SO TO AVOID BEING ISOLATED, EVEN THOUGH IT NEVER THOUGHT CSCE COULD LEAD TO SPECTACULAR RESULTS. THE US WISHED TO AVOID THE ILLUSION OF ACHIEVEMENT, WHICH WOULD SERVE THE SOVIET GOAL OF ERODING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT, CONTRIBUTING TO THE NEXT STAGE OF SOVIET STRATEGY ENTAILING A EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM. FOR THESE REASONS, THE US WOULD NOT OPPOSE AN EARLY CONCLUSION TO CSCE.

14. REGARDING THE LEVEL FOR STAGE III, THE SECRETARY POINTED OUT THAT A NUMBER OF ALLIED LEADERS HAD SAID THEY FAVORED A SUMMIT, AND THE US HAD NOT WISHED TO BE ISOLATED ON THIS ISSUE. US INTEREST IN THE LEVEL EXISTED ONLY INsofar AS THE ISSUE OF A SUMMIT COULD BE BROUGHT TO BEAR TO HELP PRODUCE A BETTER DOCUMENT. STATING SO OFTEN THAT THE LEVEL OF STAGE III DEPENDS ON STAGE II RESULTS CAN LEAD TO EXCESSIVE INTRANSIGENCE, HE SAID THE ALLIES NEED TO DEFINE EXACTLY WHAT MINIMUM THEY REQUIRED IN STAGE II IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY STAGE III. ALL THE ALLIES KNEW, IF THEY REFLECTED, WHAT MARGIN WAS ATTAINABLE. THE ISSUE WAS TO DECIDE IF THE MAXIMUM ATTAINABLE WOULD JUSTIFY A SUMMIT. IF SO, THE ALLIES SHOULD AGREE. IF NOT, THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE TOLD THAT THE ALLIES SAW NOTHING THAT WOULD JUSTIFY A SUMMIT, LEST THE ALLIES PAY HEAVILY IN THE LOSS OF SOVIET GOOD WILL.

15. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD THE UNEASY FEELING THAT IN MANY COUNTRIES -- INCLUDING THE US -- A SITUATION WAS ARISING WHERE DETENTE WAS BEING TAKEN OOBIGINTTD. BOTH HARD-LINE AND LIBERAL ELEMENTS WERE COMBINING TO TAKE

A TOUGH STANCE TOWARD THE SOVIETS AND DETENTE. TO ACCEPT THIS WOULD BE EASY. BUT ENCOURAGING SUCH TENDENCIES TO THE POINT WHERE IT COULD RESTRICT WHAT THE SOVIETS NOW CONSIDERED TO BE TO THEIR ADVANTAGE IN DETENTE MAY LEAD THE SOVIETS BACK TO A HARDER COURSE. FOR THIS REASON, THE US WAS CONCERNED NOT TO HECTOR THE SOVIETS

A WEEK BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO MOSCOW. IT HAD TAKEN A LONG TIME TO ACHIEVE RELAXATION OF TENSIONS AND THE CURRENT SITUATION SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN FOR SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 132394

GRANTED. THEREFORE, THE US WISHED, IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, TO LIMIT CONFRONTATIONS TO ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS AND THUS TO AVOID INVIDIOUS REFERENCES IN THE COMMUNIQUE TO SOVIET POLICIES. THE SECRETARY SUGGESTED THE ALLIES COULD SAY THAT PROGRESS STILL NEEDED TO BE MADE. CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDE AS DISAPPOINTING SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE AVOIDED.

16. WITH REGARD TO CSCE SPECIFICALLY, THE SECRETARY SAID WE UNDERSTAND AND SHARE THE FEAR OF THE FRG THAT CSCE WOULD BE USED TO RATIFY THE DIVISION OF GERMANY OR TO UNDERMINE QUADRIpartite RIGHTS. THEREFORE, WE SUPPORT GERMAN AND ALLIED EFFORTS TO OBTAIN SATISFACTORY LANGUAGE GUARANTEEING EXISTING QUADRIpartite RIGHTS IN GERMANY AND ON THE ISSUE OF PEACEFUL CHANGE OF FRONTIERS. HE POINTED OUT THE DANGERS OF REGISTERING CLAUSES IN DOCUMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS ONLY TO WITHDRAW THEM LATER. IT WAS BETTER TO GET THE ALLIED POSITION STRAIGHT BEFORE DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS. THE SECRETARY ALSO SAID THAT THE US SHARED ALLIED VIEWS ON THE NEED FOR APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO ENHANCE SECURITY, SUCH AS ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS. ON BASKET III, HE STATED THAT IN THE US VIEW AN AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEM WHICH HAD EXISTED FOR OVER 50 YEARS WOULD NOT LIKELY BE CHANGED BY THE INTRODUCTION OF SOME WESTERN NEWSPAPERS INTO THE SOVIET UNION. THE USSR WILL NOT BE SUBSTANTIALLY ALTERED BY AN OVERLY AMBITIOUS BASKET III. THUS, WHILE THE US SUPPORTS THE GENERAL THRUST OF WESTERN EFFORTS TO OBTAIN CONCRETE AGREEMENTS IN BASKET III, THE ALLIES MUST BE REALISTIC.

17, THE US DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN DELIBERATIONS OF THE EC-NINE CONCERNING CSCE, THE SECRETARY SAID, THOUGH IT SUPPORTS, IN PRINCIPLE, THE GENERAL OBJECTIVES OF THE NINE. HOWEVER, THE NATO COMMUNIQUE SHOULD NOT REFER TO ALLIED "DISAPPOINTMENT" WITH CSCE. US INTERESTS IN CSCE INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: TO PREVENT CSCE FROM BEING USED TO UNDERMINE THE UNITY OF THE ALLIANCE; TO AVOID SINGLING-OUT THE FRG AND PERMANENT INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE FRG; TO AVOID THE ILLUSION THAT EXISTING

EAST-WEST RELATIONS ARE LESS SATISFACTORY THAN THEY ACTUALLY ARE;
SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 132394

ALLY ARE; AND TO OBTAIN FOR THE WEST THE MARGINAL BENEFITS WHICH MIGHT REALISTICALLY ACCRUE FROM CSCE. THE US POSITION SHOULD BE INTERPRETED WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK.

18. MEANWHILE, THE SECRETARY SAID, THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BEGIN TO CONSIDER WHAT WOULD REPRESENT A SATISFACTORY CSCE OUTCOME AND SUGGESTED THAT LUNS SCHEDULE EARLY CONSULTATIONS ON THIS QUESTION.

19. LUNS COMMENDED THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT AND AGREED THAT THE ALLIES MUST "NAVIGATE BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS," AVOIDING OVERENTHUSIASM, BUT PERHAPS SAYING SOMETHING ON CSCE IN THE COMMUNIQUE FOR THE BENEFIT OF WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION. LUNS SAID HE WOULD ARRANGE FOR NATO CONSULTATIONS TO TAKE STOCK OF DEVELOPMENTS AT CSCE.

20. THE SECRETARY REITERATED THAT HE STRONGLY AGREED WITH THE NECESSITY OF NAVIGATING BETWEEN "EUPHORIA AND PETTY INTRANSIGENCE" AND SAID THE WEST MUST REMAIN VIGILANT. SIMILARLY, THE ALLIES MUST BE ALERT TO EFFORTS BY MOSCOW TO ASSERT A RIGHT TO PERMANENT INTERVENTION IN GERMAN AFFAIRS. THERE WOULD BE DANGER IF THE END RESULT OF CSCE WERE MERE AGREEMENT ON DECLARATIONS OF INTENT, WITH NO REAL PROGRESS ON SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS.

21. SHARP (CANADA) NOTED THE SECRETARY'S COMMENTS AND EMPHASIZED THAT THE CANADIANS HAD ALWAYS SHOWN GREAT SKEPTICISM OVER SOVIET MOTIVES. AT PRESENT, CANADA BELIEVES THE PROBLEM IS TO DETERMINE HOW BEST TO PROCEED, IN LIGHT OF THE IMPASSE AT GENEVA, TO DETERMINE WHETHER POSITIVE RESULTS ARE OBTAINABLE. THE CANADIANS BELIEVE DETENTE IS NOT QUITE HERE, BUT WANT TO PURSUE EFFORTS TOWARDS STRENGTHENING EAST-WEST RELATIONS. IN ANY CASE, HE SAID, CANADA BELIEVES THE TIME HAS NOT YET COME TO CONCLUDE THAT THE WEST CANNOT ATTAIN AT LEAST SOME OF ITS OBJECTIVES AT CSCE. IT STILL SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT THE USSR MIGHT BE WILLING TO TAKE POSITIVE STEPS TOWARD REDUCING TENSIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE IN ORDER TO KEEP A FREE HAND TOWARD CHINA.

SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 132394

22. AS FOR BASKET III FREER MOVEMENT PROPOSALS, THESE ARE "ALMOST OF THE ESSENCE FOR CANADA," A COUNTRY OF IMMIGRANTS, MANY FROM EASTERN EUROPE, WHO LOOK ON CSCE WITH HOPES OF REDUCING TENSIONS AND STRENGTHENING

CONTACTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. CANADIANS FULLY REALIZE THAT NATO REMAINS NECESSARY AS A SECURE BASE FROM WHICH THE WEST CAN TRY TO BRING ABOUT DETENTE, BUT THEY HAVE NO INTENTION OF INTERFERING IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE USSR OR ANY OTHER COUNTRY.

23. FRYDENLUNDE (NORWAY) THOUGHT IT TRUE, AS THE SECRETARY HAD SAID, THAT EUROPEANS HAD TAKEN THE LEAD ON CSCE. THE EUROPEANS BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT THEY COULD NOT INDEFINITELY TALK ABOUT DETENTE WITHOUT PRODUCING TANGIBLE RESULTS. WHILE THE US HAS BILATERAL TIES OF ALL KINDS WITH THE USSR, THE SMALLER WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES MUST DEVELOP THEIR DIALOGUE WITH THE EAST THROUGH MULTILATERAL CONSULTATIONS -- LIKE THOSE AT CSCE. NORWAY FINDS THE RESULTS AT GENEVA "DISCOURAGING," BUT BELIEVES THE WEST SHOULD KEEP TRYING TO ACHIEVE POSITIVE RESULTS. ALSO, NORWAY WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE WEST MUST REFUSE TO ACCEPT TIME PRESSURES AND SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT CSCE NEGOTIATIONS MUST PROCEED IN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH THE HELSINKI MANDATES. NORWAY AGREES WITH THE SECRETARY'S PROPOSAL THAT THE ALLIES CONSULT ON WHAT WOULD JUSTIFY A SUMMIT. SUCH CONSULTATIONS SHOULD BE AS FACTUAL AND REALISTIC AS POSSIBLE. AT THE SAME TIME, THE ALLIES SHOULD BE PREPARED TO BE FORTHCOMING AT CSCE, WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES THERE JUSTIFY IT.

24. AGUSTSSON (ICELAND) EMPHASIZED ONLY THAT IT HAS COME AS "A GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT" THAT THE GENEVA TALKS HAVE THUS FAR BEEN UNABLE TO ACHIEVE THE RESULTS ANTICIPATED IN THE HELSINKI MANDATE. HOWEVER, WESTERN PARTICIPANT STATES SHOULD PATIENTLY CONTINUE THEIR WORK AT THE CONFERENCE, SINCE POSTPONEMENTS OR ADJOURNMENTS MIGHT WELL BE DANGEROUS.

25. CALLAGHAN (UK) EMPHASIZED THAT THE QUESTION OF A CSCE SUMMIT WILL NOT BE DECIDED ON THE BASIS OF RESULTS
SECRET

PAGE 09 STATE 132394

AT GENEVA FOR TRADING INCREASED CIRCULATION OF MAGAZINES IN THE EAST FOR AGREEMENT ON INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS IS MANIFESTLY NOT A FAIR BARGAIN. FROM THE BEGINNING, THE CSCE SCALES HAVE BEEN BALANCED IN MOSCOW'S FAVOR. IF THE QUESTION OF A SUMMIT IS NOT DECIDED ON THE MERITS OF CSCE PROPOSALS THEMSELVES, THEN THE WEST SHOULD LOOK ELSEWHERE IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY ONE. DESPITE COMPLEXITIES OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN CSCE, A SUMMIT CANNOT BE RULED OUT, IF THE SOVIETS WANT ONE STRONGLY. MOREOVER, THE ALLIES MIGHT SAFELY PARTICIPATE IN A SUMMIT, IF THE ALLIES DO NOT LET THEIR GUARD DOWN AND IF THEY REMAIN REALISTIC. ESSENTIALLY, THE UK BELIEVES THE ALLIES SHOULD CONSULT IN ORDER TO OBTAIN A CLEAR AGREEMENT ON THEIR NEEDS. THEN THEY SHOULD TEST THE SOVIETS TO DETER-

MINE THEIR REQUIREMENTS. AFTER THIS, THE ALLIANCE WOULD BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO PASS JUDGMENT ON CONVENING A SUMMIT. WHILE THE UK WENT ALONG WITH THE REST OF THE EC-NINE IN FORMULATING THEIR POSITION ON LSCE, IT DID NOT BELIEVE THAT POSITION NEEDED TO BE PUSHED UNDULY. IT

SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, BUT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD NOW MAKE ITS OWN DECISION ON THE MATTER.

26. SAUVAGNARGUES (FRANCE) NOTED HE PERSONALLY HAD ALWAYS HAD MANY DOUBTS ABOUT CSCE. HE AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY'S ANALYSIS OF THE SOVIET MOTIVES. HE WAS CONCERNED THAT CSCE MIGHT BE SEEN AS "A SUBSTITUTE FOR PEACE" AND THAT IT MIGHT OPEN THE WAY TO A PERMANENT SOVIET VOICE IN THE AFFAIRS OF WESTERN EUROPE. THE ALLIES MUST AVOID A TRAP THAT MOSCOW MAY HAVE SET FOR THEM. FRANCE SAW FEW POSSIBLE RESULTS IN BASKET III, AND BELIEVED IN ANY EVENT THAT "WORDS WILL
<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 27 JUL 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ALLIANCE, MEETING AGENDA, POLICIES, MINISTERIAL MEETINGS, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 20 JUN 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974STATE132394
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: EUR/EE:MVANHEUVEN:EUR/RPM:RHFROWICK:GP
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D740161-1120
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740688/abbryzog.tel
Line Count: 395
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN EUR
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags: ANOMALY
Review Date: 20 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <20 MAR 2002 by kelleyw0>; APPROVED <09 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NATOMIN OTTAWA: MORNING SESSION, JUNE 19 GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE; VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR
TAGS: PFOR, NATO
To: ALL NATO CAPITALS
GENEVA
VIENNA INFO MOSCOW
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005